What
are we Afraid of? What Should we be Afraid of?
As of April 2006 the White House admitted
that there was no weapons crisis to solve. The proposed
threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction became
a falsification, or more charitably, “an intelligence
error”. As Guardian Newspapers London reported: “The
White House has acknowledged for the first time that
a key moment in post- war Iraq, the declaration by George
Bush that ‘we have found the weapons of mass destruction’,
was based on intelligence known in Washington to be false.” Needless
to say, the hunt for weapons of mass destruction ended
much more delicately than it began. The administrations
subtle closing to a hunt that began with bold statements
about the exact amounts and whereabouts of Iraq’s
weapon stockpiles draws attention towards the motivation
for the war. At the time of invasion, Saddam posed “an
imminent threat” towards the United States. Despite
overwhelming evidence from United Nations weapons inspectors
claiming that Iraq had no weapons program, the White
House maintained that Iraq was willing and able to attack
the United States, using this “evidence” as
keystone to invade Iraq.
With the eventual collapse of the weaponry
accusation, the Bush Administration now justifies the
war with the proposal of a liberated and democratic Iraq.
Saddam was clearly one of the more brutal dictators known
to man, however his cruelty towards his own people did
not seem to be of issue until his terrorist ties and
his weapons of mass destruction became questionable.
When the justification for invasion was at a minimum,
Washington suddenly became concerned about the well being
of the Iraqi people. Saddam’s grotesque human rights
violations abruptly became a foreign policy issue, and
even evolved into a scare tactic of sorts.
Living under Saddam’s treachery
would indeed be a cruel fate. Paul Rieckhoff, author
and American GI states that “Saddam had proven
to be an evil and oppressing monster. He and his sons
brutalized an entire nation into submission. The world
knew of Saddam’s atrocities. He had gassed his
own people” (17). Saddam’s oppressive regime
clearly made use of scare tactics in order to streamline
his power. Yet public opinion remained largely indifferent
to his tyrannical power until members of the Bush Administration
brought it to the attention of the populace. At which
point he was not only recognized as a threat to his own
people, but a general ‘fear Saddam’ mood
began to circulate throughout the United States. In essence,
even though the existence Saddam’s weapons programs
were questionable, and his terrorist connections refutable,
he was still a ‘bad guy’.
A new situation was presented to the
American people; what if this mad dictator continues
is reign unchecked? From personal experience, the general
assumption among the pro war public was a World War III
scenario, stemmed from an immoral dictator looking to
expand his territorial reign. Although Saddam’s
military was clearly in no shape to take offensive action
after the Gulf War, his cruelty was comparable to Hitler.
Saddam’s brutality alone provided reason enough
for many Americans to fear his power.
Yet as Rieckhoff puts it, “Bush
said killing Saddam was not the primary reason he was
sending us. He was sending us to find weapons that were
threatening to America” (18).The mixed messages
that troubled Rieckhoff present question concerning the
liberation argument. Sure Saddam was a horrible person,
but why were his atrocities viewed as second hand to
an unstable case about his weapons capabilities? Viewing
the invasion in hindsight, it becomes apparent that Weapons
of Mass Destruction evoke far more fear than a next to
non-existent military. The liberation of an oppressed
people was not of issue to the Bush Administration. The
aim was instead to evoke a sense of panic within the
American people that would justify the invasion. Fighting
the good fight was not a matter of importance, justifying
the first punch was the underlying intention of every
case made against Iraq.
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