What are we Afraid of? What Should we be Afraid of?

          Contrary to the alleged connection between Saddam and Al Qaeda, the case for Iraq’s weapons was not presented without support. For instance, upon the closure of the Gulf War, Iraq became subject to UN Security Council Resolution 687. The Resolution, among other things, required that Iraq “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision” of its then existent weapons programs. For enforcement, the resolution also provided for the creation of a UN special commission (or UNSCOM) to carry out on-site inspection and destruction of Iraq’s weapons capabilities. As American Journal for International Law editor Sean Murphy reported:

          From 1991 to 1998, UNSCOM experienced mixed success, destroying many weapons of mass destruction, but also encountering considerable Iraqi resistance to inspection activities. In august 1998, Iraq suspended cooperation with UNSCOM on disarmament activities and also limited the commission’s monitoring and verification activities.

          Given the circumstances provided, there was some legitimate suspicion surrounding Iraq after the outing of UNSCOM. Furthermore, Iraqi resistance to UNSCOM activities provides the possibility that weapons programs were hidden during inspections, and even advanced after 1998. While viewed in void of all other available information surrounding the topic, Iraq’s evasiveness towards UNSCOM leaves countless scenarios for the apprehensive citizen to ponder. However when examined in the light of other facts presented to Washington at the time of invasion, illogicality becomes apparent.

          On February 5 th 2003, Colin Powell made a televised address to the United Nations concerning, as he saw it, Iraq’s refusal to disarm. Amongst other claims meant to prove beyond a doubt that Iraq had an elaborate weapons program, Powell presented a satellite image of several cargo trucks. As Sean Murphy reported: “While two US intelligence agencies issued a report stating that biological weapon ‘agent production is the only consistent, logical purpose for these vehicles,’ the intelligence bureau of the Department of State reportedly did not share that assessment” (Security Council Recognition of US Postwar Role in Iraq 683). Above all, it seems that if Powell was really concerned with proving, beyond a doubt, that Iraq possessed WMD capabilities, he would not have presented a scenario in which his own intelligence disagreed on. Furthermore, when the United States did recover the suspected weapons labs, “the trucks did not contain any identifiable residue of biological agents” (Murphy 682). Essentially, the Whitehouse was finding and presenting whatever evidence worked for the moment. In this circumstance, the Bush Administration was telling the United States and even the world to some extent, to fear a blurry satellite image of two cargo trucks.