As of April 2006 the White House admitted that there was no weapons crisis to solve. The proposed threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction became a falsification, or more charitably, “an intelligence error”. As Guardian Newspapers London reported: “The White House has acknowledged for the first time that a key moment in post- war Iraq, the declaration by George Bush that ‘we have found the weapons of mass destruction’, was based on intelligence known in Washington to be false.” Needless to say, the hunt for weapons of mass destruction ended much more delicately than it began. The administrations subtle closing to a hunt that began with bold statements about the exact amounts and whereabouts of Iraq’s weapon stockpiles draws attention towards the motivation for the war. At the time of invasion, Saddam posed “an imminent threat” towards the United States. Despite overwhelming evidence from United Nations weapons inspectors claiming that Iraq had no weapons program, the White House maintained that Iraq was willing and able to attack the United States, using this “evidence” as keystone to invade Iraq.
With the eventual collapse of the weaponry accusation, the Bush Administration now justifies the war with the proposal of a liberated and democratic Iraq. Saddam was clearly one of the more brutal dictators known to man, however his cruelty towards his own people did not seem to be of issue until his terrorist ties and his weapons of mass destruction became questionable. When the justification for invasion was at a minimum, Washington suddenly became concerned about the well being of the Iraqi people. Saddam’s grotesque human rights violations abruptly became a foreign policy issue, and even evolved into a scare tactic of sorts.
Living under Saddam’s treachery would indeed be a cruel fate. Paul Rieckhoff, author and American GI states that “Saddam had proven to be an evil and oppressing monster. He and his sons brutalized an entire nation into submission. The world knew of Saddam’s atrocities. He had gassed his own people” (17). Saddam’s oppressive regime clearly made use of scare tactics in order to streamline his power. Yet public opinion remained largely indifferent to his tyrannical power until members of the Bush Administration brought it to the attention of the populace. At which point he was not only recognized as a threat to his own people, but a general ‘fear Saddam’ mood began to circulate throughout the United States. In essence, even though the existence Saddam’s weapons programs were questionable, and his terrorist connections refutable, he was still a ‘bad guy’.
A new situation was presented to the American people; what if this mad dictator continues is reign unchecked? From personal experience, the general assumption among the pro war public was a World War III scenario, stemmed from an immoral dictator looking to expand his territorial reign. Although Saddam’s military was clearly in no shape to take offensive action after the Gulf War, his cruelty was comparable to Hitler. Saddam’s brutality alone provided reason enough for many Americans to fear his power.
Yet as Rieckhoff puts it, “Bush said killing Saddam was not the primary reason he was sending us. He was sending us to find weapons that were threatening to America” (18).The mixed messages that troubled Rieckhoff present question concerning the liberation argument. Sure Saddam was a horrible person, but why were his atrocities viewed as second hand to an unstable case about his weapons capabilities? Viewing the invasion in hindsight, it becomes apparent that Weapons of Mass Destruction evoke far more fear than a next to non-existent military. The liberation of an oppressed people was not of issue to the Bush Administration. The aim was instead to evoke a sense of panic within the American people that would justify the invasion. Fighting the good fight was not a matter of importance, justifying the first punch was the underlying intention of every case made against Iraq.
Page 4 of 5